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How E.T. Got Through Customs: The Court of
International Trade Holds Fantasy Toys Eligible
for Duty-Free Status Under the Generalized
System of Preferences
E.T., the extraterrestrial character in the Stephen Spielberg
movie of the same name, I recently appeared in a new role as the star
of an international trade case. The plot involved the economic de-
velopment of third world countries and the growing importance of
the United States as the world's biggest consumer of stuffed toys. In
order to advance both of these interests, the Court of International
Trade (CIT) overruled previous trade cases and redefined a tariff
classification in order to allow stuffed figures of E.T. to be imported
into this country duty-free.
In Kamar International Inc. v. United States,2 an American toy man-
ufacturer, Kamar, attempted to import stuffed figures of E.T. into
the United States from Taiwan without paying a duty.3 Under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), selected items from devel-
oping countries are eligible to be imported duty-free.4 The U.S.
Customs Service refused to classify the E.T. toy as such an item, and
Kamar appealed the customs classification to the Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CIT).
I E.T. was a toddler-sized, wrinkled and wizened, pot-bellied alien who was acciden-
tally left behind when his spaceship visited California. He was rescued and protected by a
10 year old boy with whom he formed a magical friendship. The film, E.T. (Universal
Pictures 1982), has been called "the most popular movie in Hollywood history." Spielberg's
Creativity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1982 at DI, col. 1.
2 Kamar International Inc. v. United States, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1442 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Oct. 16, 1986).
s Kamar was the only toy company licensed by Spielberg to manufacture stuffed Ex-
tra-Terrestrials, although it originally turned down the chance to market E.T. because in
two dimensional photographs he didn't look "too hot." Fortunately for the company, an
executive saw E.T. on film and decided the alien was worth a risk. The brown vinyl E.T.
character tripled Kamar Industries' sales within six months of the movie's premiere. E. T.
and Friends Are Flying High, Bus. WK., Jan. 10, 1983, at 77. Due to the huge success of the
stuffed toy, Kamar eventually opened 50 factories in Taiwan and stopped all other manu-
facturing in order to keep up with the demand for Extra-Terrestrials. Makers of E. T. Deny
Earthly Imposters, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1982, at D5, col. 4. Kamar took great pains to pro-
tect its license, and in October 1985 took out full page newspaper ads declaring that it did
not intend to share its success: "So, if by chance you're toying with an idea similar to E.T.
we urge you to remember those interesting gentlemen who wear black robes and decide
other people's destinies .... Enough said?" Id. at D2, col. 1.
4 See infra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
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Upon first glance, this case appears to be very simple and direct.
The CIT acknowledged that there was only one issue to be resolved,
"whether stuffed toys depicting the imaginary character E.T. which
do not represent any person or thing known to be living on earth or
elsewhere are 'toy figures of an animate object' within the meaning
of item 737.30 TSUS [Tariff Schedules of the United States]." '5
Kamar claimed E.T. was an animate being, so stuffed E.T. toys
should be classified under item 737.30 (toy figures of animate ob-
jects). 6 Items in this classification were eligible for GSP status. 7 But
the U.S. Customs Service claimed that E.T. was not an animate being
and placed the stuffed toys under item 737.95 (toys not specifically
provided for),8 with a tariff rate of 13.6% ad valorem.9 Thus, the issue
in this case was whether E.T. was entitled to duty-free customs treat-
ment as a product from a beneficiary country under the GSP. In an
amusing and imaginative opinion, the CIT ruled that E.T. is, in fact,
an animate object, and toys created in his likeness are entitled to
GSP status. 10
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development for-
mulated the groundwork for the Generalized System of Preferences
in 1964 in an effort to increase the wealth of developing countries
through trade rather than through foreign aid." 1 As spokesperson
for developing countries at the conference, Argentinian economist
Raul Prebisch suggested that developed countries grant temporary,
duty-free entry to products imported from developing nations. 12
This tariff preference would enhance those countries' ability to com-
pete in the international market by lowering the product cost to con-
sumers in developed countries.' 3
The United States was opposed to the GSP when first intro-
5 Kamar, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1443.
6 Id. The rate of duty that would have applied to items in this category from
noncommunist, non-GSP eligible countries was 11.2% ad valorem. Id.
7 Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (1982), sch. 7, pt. 5, subpt. E
[hereinafter TSUS].
8 Id.
9 An ad valorem tax is "a tax imposed on the value of property ... laid in the form of
a percentage on the value of the property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979).
Items in the nonspecific category would normally be GSP-eligible and thus duty-free,
but Taiwan and Korea had been taken off the list of beneficiary importing countries in this
category. TSUS, supra note 7, General Headnote 3(c)(iii). Ste infra note 58 and accompa-
nying text.
10 Kamar, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1443.
1I Note, Renewal of the GSP: an Explanation of the Program and Changes Made by the 1984
Legislation, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 625, 633 (1985).
12 Statement by Mr. Raul Prebisch, Secretary-General of the United Nation's Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, 2 Trade & Dev. Pol. Statements 76, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
46/141 (1964).
13 The GSP scheme is beneficial to developed countries as well as developing coun-
tries since a decrease in importation costs will lower the price of the product to consumers.
Note, supra note I1, at 633; see supra note 32 and accompanying text. In addition, strength-
ening the economies of developing nations by encouraging trade should provide a broader
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duced, in part, because the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATF)1 4 was based upon the concept of nondiscrimination among
member countries. According to the Most Favored Nation clause
(MFN), tariff rates were to be the same for imports from any GATT
member nation. t5 The MFN clause was obviously in direct conflict
with the philosophy of the GSP.' 6 GSP negotiations, which took
place within the GATT in 1971, resolved the issue with the adoption
of a ten year waiver of the MFN clause.' 7 The waiver permitted, but
did not require, member nations to implement GSP programs.
The GATT waiver, international developments during the
1970s, 18 and pressure from other developed countries resulted in
the adoption of a GSP program by the United States in 1974.19
Under this program, GSP status is restricted by both the designation
of beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and by the restriction of
eligible products from those countries. Designation of BDCs and de-
termination of eligible articles is a power granted to the President
under the 1974 Trade Act, 20 but he is required to make these deter-
minations based upon criteria established by Congress.2 1
market for U.S. exports. Id.; see also Hackney and Shafer, Protectionism and Developing Coun-
tries: The Impact on Trade and Debt, 23 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 203, 206 (1987).
14 The GATT is a treaty among 120 nations that provides general rules of interna-
tional trade among its members. Following World War l1 the treaty was drafted for the
purpose of achieving multilateral, nondiscriminatory, reciprocal tariff reductions. There
have been seven rounds of negotiations since the inception of the GATT in which mul-
tilevel tariff rates have been reduced and international trade rules have been promulgated.
For an overview of the GATT and how it works, see E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION 3-44 (1986); J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT:
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 142-70 (1986).
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A 1,
A12-13, 4 Treaties and Other Int'l Agreements of the United States 639, at 641-42, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, 196-98.
16 The MFN/GSP controversy continues to surface in criticisms of the effects the GSP
has had on international trade. For arguments promoting the reimplementation of the
MFN, see Balassa, The Tokyo Round and the Developing Countries, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93
(1980); Nicolaides, Preferences for Developing Countries: A Critique, 19J. WORLD TRADE L. 373
(1985).
17 GAIT: Protocol on Reciprocal Tariff Concessions Among Developing Countries,
Dec. 8, 1971, reproduced from GATT Doc. [U3643 in II INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 737
(1972). See also Espiell, The MFN Clause: Its Present Significance in GATT, 5J. WORLD TRADE
L. 29 (1971); Espiell, GATT: According Generalized Preferences, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 341
(1974). This 10 year waiver is now permanent in Article 28 of the GATT. See MCGOVERN,
supra note 14, at 277.
18 These international developments included U.S. fear of a "cartelization of world
trade" which would hinder the universal free-flow of products, and the desire to make a
substantial political statement of concern for the economies of developing countries.
Note, supra note 11, at 632-33.
19 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2461-2465 (1982)).
20 Id.
21 Factors which the President must consider when determining whether a nation
should be granted BDC status under the GSP include: (1) the desire of the country to be a
BDC; (2) the economic stature of the country; (3) whether or not other developed nations
have extended it GSP status; (4) the commitment of the country to reciprocate by provid-
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GSP status is granted to various items via the TSUS. The TSUS
separates imports into eight major categories, and each category is
broken down into several hundred items. Each item is identified by
an official citation number, given a general description, and assigned
two tariff rates. Rate 1 applies to those importing countries that are
considered MFN under the GAT, while the higher rate 2 designates
the tariff for products from communist countries. 22 The GSP
designation of each item is also included in the tables. An article is
either ineligible for preferential treatment, eligible for GSP status if
imported from any BDC, or eligible for GSP status if imported from
selected BDCs. 23
An importer who believes his products have been wrongly de-
nied GSP status may pursue two options. One alternative is to peti-
tion the President's subcommittee on the GSP to add the specific
item to the list of GSP-eligible products.2 4 Any "interested party"2 5
may file a petition, but it must contain very detailed information
about the effect such a change in status would have on the economies
of both the United States and the exporting country. 26 The most
common reason for rejecting such petitions is the lack of sufficient
documentation regarding these effects. 27
For this reason many manufacturers may choose the alternate
route of filing a claim with the CIT to protest a U.S. Customs deci-
sion denying GSP status. 28 Filing such a claim is appropriate in four
circumstances, and one of these is that seen in the Kamar case: "Cus-
ing the United States with access to its markets. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)
(1982), cited in Note, supra note 11, at 638-39. Factors which will preclude a country from
becoming a BDC under the GSP are: Communism, OPEC membership, or interests po-
tentially harmful to the United States. Id. Other factors that may preclude the granting of
BDC status are: nationalization or expropriation of United States property without con-
sent, lackadaisical enforcement of drug trafficking laws, failure to enforce arbitration
awards received by U.S. citizens, and aiding or abetting terrorism. The President may
overlook this last set of factors if he determines that it would be in the best interest of the
United States to designate the applicant nation a BDC. Id.
22 This bifurcation of U.S. tariff rates came into existence with the enactment of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 that increased tariff rates for most communist countries.
Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. pt. 1, 590.
23 For a more detailed explanation of the tariff schedules see Feller, An Introduction to
TariffClassification, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 991 (1976).
24 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(a)(1) (1985).
25 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(c) (1985).
26 A petition must contain information explaining the expected effect the GSP status
would have on the petitioner's industry and his competition. It must list sources of com-
petition and describe the markets involved. If available, the petition must also provide
information on specific industry variables such as employment statistics, sales records,
profit and cost analyses, production statistics, and a list of all known BDCs exporting the
article in question. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.1(a)(4)(i)-(iii) (1985). See Note, supra note 11, at 643.
27 Note, supra note 11, at 643.
28 For a discussion of the advantages of the judicial system over executive challenges
to resolve U.S. Customs disputes see Note, The Very Specialized United States Generalized System
of Preferences: An Examination of Renewal Changes and Analysis of Their Legal Effect, 15 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 39 (1985).
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toms requires the merchandise to be entered under a non-GSP
TSUS item number, and the importer believes the goods should be
classified under a GSP-eligible item number."' 29
It is not uncommon for a conflict to arise when an article ap-
pears to be classifiable under more than one item number. The
headnotes to the TSUS provide rules to govern which item number
should be used in these situations. Headnote 10(c) 3 0 provides the
most important of these rules, the rule of relative specificity. 3 ' This
rule states that the provision which more specifically describes the
article in question is the item number to be applied.3 2
In applying this rule to Kamar, it would seem that there is no
question as to which is the more specific item number. "Toy figures
of an animate object" is certainly more specific than "toys not specif-
ically provided for." The Customs Service* argued, however, that the
more specific description did not apply to E.T. as fantasy figures
were not animate objects. Therefore, the CIT had to determine
whether or not "animate" was an apt description of E.T.
In Kamar the court first states that a tariff term is to be "con-
strued in its commonly received and popular sense"33 unless the in-
tention of Congress is otherwise expressed.3 4 The common
meaning of "animate" was first applied by the CIT3 5 in H. Hudson
Dobson v. United States in which the court ruled that "an animate ob-
ject is one representing animals or people, that is possessing animal
life, [while] inanimate objects are those which are not endowed with
animal life, such as benches, trees, fences, etc."3 6
An examination of CIT precedent reveals that the court has
ruled several times on whether toys are representative of animate
objects. In the 1952 Hudson decision, the merchandise in dispute was
invoiced as "Dinky Toys."'3 7 These consisted of toy figures of
motorcycles, trucks, and police cars that contained replicas of
humans as the operators of the vehicles. The manufacturer claimed
29 Nemmers & T. Rowland, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences: Too Much System,
Too Little Preference, 9 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 855, 885 (1977).
30 TSUS, supra note 7, General Headnote 10(c).
31 Feller, supra note 23, at 1001.
32 TSUS, supra note 7, General Headnote 10(c).
33 Kamar International Inc. v. United States, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1442, 1443 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Oct. 16, 1986).
34 Id. As discussed infra at notes 56-59 and accompanying text, Congress did express
its intention otherwise. It specifically defined "inanimate" when it created a new tariff
classification of toys in the 1983 act that authorized appropriations for the U. S. Customs
Service. Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 113(a)(l), 96 Stat. 2329, 2334 (1983).
35 To avoid confusion, CIT as used in this article refers to both the CIT and its pred-
ecessor, the Customs Court. The Customs Court Act of 1980 expanded the jurisdiction
and powers of the Customs Court and changed its name to the U.S. Court of International
Trade. Customs Court Act, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 1581, 94 Stat. 1727, 1728 (1980).
36 Dobson v. United States, 28 Cust. Ct. 290, 293 (1952).
37 Id. at 291.
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that the toys were figures of animate objects and subject to a 25% ad
valorem tax, while U.S. Customs had assigned them to the category of
"toys not specifically provided for," and accordingly, assessed a 70%
ad valorem tax.3 8 In finding for Customs in this case, the court held
items consisting partly of human figures and partly of inanimate ob-
jects, in a ratio of 1:1, were not representative of animate objects;
thus, Dinky Toys were subject to duties at the higher rate.3 9
A later case dealt with a company that attempted to pass a
"Mechanical Walking Robot" through customs under the guise of an
animate object in 1958.40 Louis Marx and Co. claimed that their
"synthetic man" was an image of an animate object and dutiable at
35% ad valorem, while Customs officials claimed the robot was a toy
"not specifically provided for" and subject to the higher 50% ad
valorem tax.4 1 The CIT held that a robot was not an animate object,
but merely an automaton, which "operates through scientific or
mechanical media," and as such was ineligible for the lower tariff.4 2
Thirteen years later Louis Marx was back in the CIT again, this
time claiming that watermelons, ears of corn, and bananas endowed
with facial features and feet were representative of animate objects. 43
The only issue decided by the CIT was whether the "Mechanical
Hopping Munchie Mellon Series" fell into the category of a toy fig-
ure of an animate object with a dutiable rate of 24% ad valorem, or as
Customs argued, was a "toy not specifically provided for" and thus
subject to the higher rate of 41% ad valorem.44 Although the court
found the toys quite entertaining and the vegetables capable of hop-
ping on elongated feet in a "highly amusing manner," 45 nevertheless
it relegated the watermelons to the ranks of the "inanimate" by nar-
rowing the definition of "animate" to include only those objects rep-
resenting humans or animals.46 In conclusion, the court stated, "the
term 'figures of animate objects'... includes only those figures which
represent living beings."147
The CIT strictly adhered to this definition several months later
when asked to determine whether a "Swivel-O-Matic" astronaut was
a figure of an animate object.48 This particular astronaut possessed
arms and legs and other human features, but the court focused on
38 Id. The tariff rates for each item in the TSUS are not constant from year to year,
but are subject to adjustments by legislative or executive acts in response to economic,
industrial, or political needs. See Feller, supra note 23, at 994.
39 Dobson, 28 Cust. Ct. at 294.
40 Louis Marx & Co. v. United States, 40 Cust. Ct. 610 (1958).
41 Id. at 610.
42 Id. at 611-12.
43 Louis Marx and Co. v. United States, 66 Cust. Ct. 139 (1971).
44 Id. at 140.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 142.
47 Id.
48 Lewis Galoob Co. v. United States, 66 Cust. Ct. 484 (1971).
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the ability of the astronaut to turn his head in a full 360 degree circle,
and on the fact that his chest could open, light up, and fire guns from
within.49 The court adopted the "animate" definition from Marx and
held that since there is 'no human or other living being [with] a chest
cavity which shoots guns' the toy in question was not a representa-
tion of an animate object. 50
In Kamar, the Customs Department urged the court to apply the
very limited meaning of the word "animate" that had evolved from
this prior case law. They would define "animate" as an object repre-
sentative of an actual species of animal or human known to exist on
earth. Stating that such a narrow construction would lead to illogi-
cal distinctions, the CIT refused to hold to this precedental defini-
tion.51 As an example they describe the dilemma that would face the
Star Trek52 crew if such a system was enforced as the SS Enterprise
attempted to enter customs: Captain Kirk would be entitled to duty-
free entry while Mr. Spock, a Vulcan, would be denied that privi-
lege-an illogical result "when the only apparent differences be-
tween the two would be Mr. Spock's point[y] ears and total lack of
human emotion." 53 The court instead adopted a broad definition of
"animate," that encompasses "fictional creatures with human or
49 Id. at 486.
50 Id.
51 The only time the CIT had allowed a toy manufacturer to claim a lower tariff by
reclassification to an "animate" category occurred in the case of "Mister Egg Head" in
1974. Exhibit Sales Inc. v. United States, 72 Cust. Ct. 119 (1974). Mr. Egg Head was not a
stuffed toy but was made of metal. He was a small, egg-shaped fireman with an overgrown
head, wheels for propulsion, and a tongue which stuck out of his mouth. Id. at 120. Cus-
toms claimed that Mr. Egg Head was a "toy... not specifically provided for" and subject
to a tariff of 31% ad valorem under item 737.90 TSUS: "Humans do not have a semi-
elliptical shape, nor do their heads connect directly to their bodies; the head of the human
does not comprise one-half to two-thirds of the entire body, and the tongue does not
permanently protrude; humans do not have wheels for propulsion .. " Id. at 121. The
CIT did not accept this rationale, but admitted Mr. Egg Head into the category of "figures
of animate objects . .. not stuffed ... made almost wholly of metal" under item 737.35
TSUS with a tariff of 18.5% ad valorem. Id. at 120. It ruled that the toy was a caricature of a
fireman and that a caricature can be a representative of an animate object. Id. at 121. The
Kamar court did not refer to this case, although it would seem that E.T. might qualify as an
animate object if viewed as a human caricature.
In the most recent "animate" case to come before the CIT, the court refused to class-
ify "Super Smurfs" as animate objects, and put them into the category of "toys not specifi-
cally provided for" (TSUS 737.95). The Smurfs were so categorized not because they are
tiny blue creatures with pointy heads, but because each was packaged with, or attached to,
its own plastic accessory (skateboards, cars, go-carts, etc.). In fact, the court did not ad-
dress the question of whether Smurfs are animate objects because the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice conceded that without their accessories the Smurfs would be classified as "animate."
Wallace Berrie and Co. v. United States, No. 84-07-00937, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 9,
1988).
52 Star Trek was a science-fiction, action-adventure television serial in the 1960s. It
featured a team of space explorers, consisting of several earthlings and one Vulcan, travel-
ing on board a starship, with a mission "to go where no man has gone before."
53 Kamar International Inc. v. United States, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1442, 1444 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Oct. 16, 1986).
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animal features and characteristics that represent purported life
forms on other planets."' 54 Under this liberal definition, E.T. was
allowed to enter the United States as an animate, duty-free, stuffed
toy. 55
Near the end of the Kamar opinion the court explained that 1982
legislative action, extending the availability of the GSP status for
stuffed toys, would probably change the outcome of the case if it
were filed today. 56 This legislation, among other things, created a
new tariff classification of stuffed toys that includes representatives of
inanimate objects. The headnotes to the new classification in Sched-
ule 7, Part 5, Subpart E define "inanimate":
3 . . . "toy figures of inanimate objects"
are only imaginary creatures that either-
(i) do not possess features of human or other earthly creatures; or
(ii) possess both earthly and non-earthly features but are predomi-
nantly non-earthly in nature; or
(iii) possess features which are a hybrid of features of more than
one animate object.
This definition does not cover toy figures of objects which are read-
ily recognizable as vegetables, minerals, robots, or machines,
whether or not such figures possess humanoid or earthly features. 57
The MFN rate that Congress assigned to the inanimate category
(10.9% ad valorem), was lower than the MFN rate for animate objects
(17.5% ad valorem).58 Furthermore, toys in the new inanimate cate-
gory are entitled to GSP treatment from any BDC. Toys in the ani-
mate and nonspecific categories can lose their GSP status if their
country of origin exports more than 50% of the items in that cate-
gory during one year. 59 Thus, the new inanimate classification ap-
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. The outcome of the case would be changed only in that toy figures of E.T.
would be classified as inanimate objects. Under the new classification system, toys of inan-
imate objects are also eligible for GSP treatment. See infra notes 56-59 and accgmpanying
text.
57 Pub. L. No. 97-446, 113(a)(l), 96 Stat. 2329, 2334 (1983). A thorough search of
congressional records and committee reports failed to divulge the legislative history for
the portion of this bill that added the definition of "inanimate" to the headnotes and cre-
ated a GSP preferred category for these toys. This part of the bill was inserted by a joint
committee of representatives from both the House of Representatives and the Senate
which was formed to iron out disagreements which had prevented the passage of the bill.
In a telephone interview with Andrew Taylor of the Congressional Research Service, Mr.
Taylor suggested that since legislative history does not have to be reported for committee
meetings, he suspected that the amendment was inserted at the instigation of a toy lobby-
ist. Telephone interview with Andrew Taylor, Congressional Research Service, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 1987). Another possibility is that the recommendation came from the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which also received appropria-
tions for 1983 from this bill. The USTR operates under the executive branch of the gov-
ernment and is responsible for making discretionary decisions regarding the GSP. See
Note, supra note 11, at 636.
58 Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (1984), sch. 7, pt 5, subpt. E,
items 737.47 and 737.30.
59 Both the Republics of Korea and Taiwan have become ineligible countries from
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pears to be the most preferential of categories for stuffed toys.
Tariff rates and GSP preferences for toys are important eco-
nomic issues as the United States is currently "the world's largest
single country market" of dolls and stuffed toys. 60 Statistics show
that the toy market is experiencing a shift in both the production and
consumption aslects of the business. First, U.S. consumption of
dolls and stuffed toys has experienced a huge growth spurt over the
last ten years.6i As the consumption of dolls and stuffed toys has
risen, so has the percentage of stuffed toys in this classification.
Stuffed toys valued at over ten cents per inch of height 62 account for
the largest part of this increased consumption. 63 Therefore, the fast-
est growing segment of the doll and stuffed animal industry is com-
posed of stuffed animals produced in foreign markets, and imported
to keep pace with a rising U.S. consumption. 64
The passage of the GSP in 1974 launched the movement to-
wards foreign production of stuffed animals, since stuffed toys that
represent animate objects were immediately eligible for duty-free
treatment.65 With the advent of the GSP, many domestic toy firms
began shifting their total production to foreign labor markets in or-
der to take advantage of both the GSP preferences 66 and the eco-
nomically advantageous wage rates.67
The manufacture of stuffed animals is highly suited to the cheap,
unskilled labor markets currently found in many Asian countries
such as Taiwan and South Korea.68 In addition, small stuffed ani-
which to import stuffed toys under the GSP for this reason. Summary of Trade and Tariff
Information: Dolls and Stuffed Animals, USITC Pub. No. 841 (1980) at 4, 13 [hereinafter Sum-
mary (1980)].
60 Id. at v.
61 In 1975, Americans spent $291 million on dolls and stuffed toys. Id. By 1979 this
figure had climbed to $351.2 million, and in 1983, the last year for which figures were
available, the total spent on these items was $516.7 million. Summary of Trade and Tariff
Information: Dolls and Stuffed Animals, USITC Pub. No. 841, 2d supp. (1985), app. B, table 1,
at 12 [hereinafter Summary (1985)].
62 TSUS Item No. 737.30. This is the category in which Kamar claimed E.T. dolls
belonged.
63 During the 1981-83 period alone stuffed toy imports rose 70%. Summary (1985),
supra note 61, at 2. In 1975, imported stuffed toys accounted for $7.5 million. Summary
(1980), supra note 59, app. C, table 3, at 26. This figure increased to $78 million in 1981
and to $122.6 million in 1983. Summary (1985), supra note 61, app. B, table 2, at 13.
64 In 1979 the ratio of imported stuffed toys to domestic consumption was calculated
to be 69%. This figure climbed to 80% in 1981. Summary of Trade and Tariff Information:
Dolls and Stuffed Animals, USITC Pub. No. 841, supp. (1982), at 2-3.
65 Summary (1980), supra note 59, at 13.
66 Id. at 6.
67 Id. at 8.
68 The operation of stuffed animal production is not one that lends itself to auto-
mated assembly lines as it is highly labor intensive:
Pieces must be hand-cut and sewn to produce toy skins. The skin is sewn
inside out, leaving a small opening which allows the skin to be reversed and
the filler material blown in. Prior to stuffing, the eyes and other features are
added so that once stuffed and closed the toy is essentially complete.
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mals and action adventure dolls are fairly cheap to ship to the United
States from Asian countries. 69
Concentration of foreign production on smaller, action-adven-
ture dolls fits neatly into the practice of U.S. toy manufacturers to
produce, and retailers to offer, a "dual line" of toys. The more sta-
ble prong of this dual line is the staple doll or toy "which produces
relatively constant high-profit sales without relying on advertising or
extensive new product introductions."' 70 An example of this type of
toy would be a baby doll or a Teddy bear. "Fad or TV toy[s]" 71
make up the other line of toys. These toys are heavily advertised and
if successful will be in high demand for a relatively short period of
time. They are often replicas of television or movie personalities or
licensed characters. 72 According to the United States International
Trade Commission (USITC), the toy industry's success from licens-
ing the Star Wars characters stimulated an interest in space-oriented
creatures, a trend they saw as continuing into the future and poten-
tially gaining strength with each new crop of science fiction movies. 73
This prediction has proved to be an understatement due to the
amazing success of fantasy films and their stuffed toy spin-offs. E.T.,
Gremlins, and Ewoks may be better known to today's child than are
the Barbie dolls and G.I. Joes of yesterday.
Because the developing countries designated to benefit from the
GSP specialize in this type of toy, 74 charging a duty to import stuffed
fantasy figures such as E.T. would deprive these countries of prefer-
ential treatment when exporting potential "giants" of the toy world.
Kamar's challenge of E.T.'s customs classification can thus be seen as
Id. at 2.
69 Transportation costs are based on the space used rather than on the weight of the
freight, and these toys lend themselves to being packed tightly in high volume for
container shipment. See id. at 8.
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id. In 1983, BUSINESS WEEK reported that the licensing of characters in the toy
industry had grown from a $6.6 billion industry to a $20.6 billion industry in the period
1978-82. It suggests that E.T. would do well to waddle into Steven Spielberg's office and
demand a percentage of the "out-of-this-world profits" which the producer has collected
from the licensing of E.T. "for everything from video games to pajamas." E. T. and Friends
Are Flying High," Bus. WK., Jan. 10, 1983, at 77.
73 Summary (1980), supra note 59, at 8.
74 An informal survey at a representative toy store revealed nine stuffed fantasy
figures which did not resemble any known being on earth. Every one of these toys is
manufactured in Asia: Alf, Chubbles, Puffalumps, and the StayPuft Marshmallow Man are
all manufactured in China but marketed in the United States by Coleco, Animal Fair,
Fisher-Price, and Kenner, respectively. Furflings and the Sesame Street characters Oscar
the Grouch and the Cookie Monster are manufactured in South Korea but sold in the
United States by Axlon and Ideal. Mattel markets Poppies after they are imported from
Taiwan, and World of Wonder imports Teddy Ruxpin's friends Tweeg, Bounder, and
Grubbles from Taiwan, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong. My Monster Pets are manu-
factured in South Korea and China and distributed in this country by AmToy.
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a test case for all stuffed imaginary beings that are exported to the
United States from GSP countries.
By ruling that E.T. was an animate object, the CIT placed him,
and all other "imaginary character[s] ... which do not represent any
person[s] or thing[s] known to be living on earth or elsewhere" 75
into the most economically preferential category available for stuffed
toys, and into the only category for which GSP status was available
for fantasy toys in 1982. In so doing, the court granted E.T. the no-
duty status he would have had if his date of attempted entry had
been after the effective date of the 1983 legislation.
Although it might have appeared that the CIT was both overrul-
ing precedent and disregarding legislative intent when they ruled
that the definition of "animate" included imaginary extraterrestrials,
it is important to note that this case is the only one to deal with the
"animate" question since the origin of the GSP. Preferential treat-
ment to be accorded developing countries had not been a factor in
previous decisions. Broadening the definition of "animate" actually
gave E.T. the preferential treatment Congress intended for non-
earthly, fantasy creatures imported from GSP-designated beneficiary
countries to have, and altering the definition should have no bearing
upon future cases since the legislature has now provided an explicit
definition of "inanimate." Surely the court's departure from an es-
tablished definition was warranted in this case-besides, who ac-
quainted with E.T. could possibly believe him to be "inanimate"?
PArrI L. HOLT
75 Kamar International Inc. v. United States, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1442, 1444 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Oct. 16, 1986).

